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Sammendrag
Frafall i videreg˚aende skole er en utfordring i de fleste industrialiserte land. I Norge er
det bred enighet om at frafall er et samfunnsproblem, og det er stor politisk vilje til
a˚ innføre tiltak som kan øke gjennomstrømmingen i videreg˚aende skole, slik som dem
nylig foresl˚att av Livsoppholdsutvalget. Statistisk sett vil ungdom som ikke fullfører
videreg˚aende utdanning med et vitnema˚l gjøre det d˚arligere i arbeidsmarkedet og p˚a
andre omr˚ader senere i livet enn de som fullfører. Denne forskjellen betraktes ofte som
den potensielle gevinsten av tiltak som hjelper marginale studenter a˚ f˚a et vitnema˚l. En
alternativ forklaring er at det er andre egenskaper ved disse elevene som b˚ade fører til
frafall og d˚arlige utfall senere i livet. I s˚a fall vil slike tiltak ha begrenset effekt ettersom
de underliggende faktorene ikke blir addresert, men en slik seleksjon gjør ogs˚a spørsma˚let
om effekten av et vitnema˚l vanskelig a˚ besvare.
I denne studien undersøker vi effekten av a˚ stryke p˚a eksamen i andre klasse p˚a stud-
iespesialiserende videreg˚aende skoler p˚a senere skoleresultater, vitnema˚l og inntekt for stu-
denter som gikk i andre klasse i 2004 - 2007. For a˚ h˚andtere seleksjonsproblemene nevnt
ovenfor utnytter vi to egenskaper ved eksamenssystemet: at det er tilnærmet tilfeldig
hvem som kommer opp i muntlig og skriftlig eksamen, og at studenter som kommer opp i
skriftlig eksamen f˚ar systematisk d˚arligere karakterer. Dermed har vi et kvasi-eksperiment
hvor tilfeldige studenter trekkes til skriftlig eksamen og dermed f˚ar d˚arligere karakterer
og økt sjanse for stryk. Studenter som trekker skriftlig eksamen f˚ar eksamensresultater
som er mer enn 0,6 karakterer d˚arligere og har 3,3 prosentpoeng høyere sannsynlighet for
a˚ stryke enn de som trekker muntlig eksamen.
Vi finner at studenter som stryker grunnet tilfeldig variasjon i eksamensform, har mye
lavere sannsynlighet for a˚ f˚a vitnema˚l. Denne effekten viser seg dessuten a˚ vare over tid,
slik at flesteparten av de som ikke f˚ar vitnema˚l grunnet stryk p˚a eksamen heller ikke f˚ar
det senere i livet. Den tilfeldige trekningen av eksamensform skyver dermed en gruppe
med marginale – og relativt svake – elever ut av videreg˚aende skole for godt. Av andre
langtidsutfall ser vi at det er noe høyere sannsynlighet for a˚ ta høyere utdanning blant
dem som st˚ar p˚a eksamen. N˚ar det gjelder effekter p˚a inntekt n˚ar elevene er 18-27 a˚r
gamle er estimatene for upresise til a˚ trekke sterke konklusjoner, men effektene ligger nær
null, som kan tyde p˚a at et vitnem˚al kanskje ikke har s˚a stor effekt for denne gruppen
med elever.
Selv om trekning av eksamensform er tilfeldig, vil de negative konsekvensene av
skriftlig eksamen kunne oppleves som vilk˚arlige. N˚ar i tillegg svake studenter blir hardest
rammet av denne vilk˚arligheten, kan en stille spørsma˚l om dette er en ønsket konsekvens
av dagens eksamenssystem.
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1 Introduction1
In many western countries, combating high school dropout and increasing high school
graduation rates have been a long-term political goal. From the Educate America Act
of 1994 through OECD’s Education at a Glance reports (OECD, 2018) to more recent
endeavors such as the Subsistence commission in Norway (NOU2018:13, 2018), policy-
makers have proposed various policies and interventions to address this concern (Lamb
et al., 2011). These concerns have been particularly strong in countries where dropout
rates are increasing, such as the US (Card and Lemieux, 2001; Heckman and LaFontaine,
2010). When these policies are discussed, it is often with an implicit or explicit reference
to the sizable differences in later life outcomes such as earnings, subsistence or welfare
dependency between high school graduates and dropouts.
These differences can of course not be given a causal interpretation as the effect of
finishing high school, as there can be strong selection into and out of high school. A large
literature in economics have investigated the rates of return to education, with internal
rates of return as large as 50 percent (Heckman et al., 2008) for high school completion,
or around 11% per year for basic levels of schooling (Bhuller et al., 2017), suggesting that
investments in schooling in general and high school in particular are highly profitable.
Nonetheless, in a world with heterogeneous treatment effects, it is unclear how these
or other estimates of returns to schooling apply to the marginal students targeted by
policies aimed at reducing dropout rates. These students could for instance have lower
than average treatment effects of finishing high school because they might learn less during
high school even if they complete and because their diplomas will be weak even if they
get one. It is unclear how the labor market values these marginal diplomas.
We aim to inform this question by exploiting the quasi-random allocation to exam form
in Norwegian high schools. In second grade of high school at age 17 to 18, Norwegian high
school students at the academic track are drawn to take one exam in a graduating course,
either oral or written. The allocation is supposed to be random given course choices
made the previous year, and we document how students allocated to the oral and written
exam are statistically indistinguishable based on predetermined performance and family
background. Being allocated the oral exam has three important consequences: First, the
course teacher is part if the examination committee, and although the external examiner
has the final word on the exam grade, this allows the schools to affect the grading. Second,
a friendly face in the committee might help the student perform better and the exercise
might be simpler than the centralized written exam. Third, some students may just
perform better in oral versus written exams.
We show that the potentially positive consequences largely dominate this relationship,
1We thank Lars Kirkebøen, Magne Mogstad, Simon Bensnes, Edwin Leuven, Brita Bye, Kjetil Telle
and other colleagues at Statistics Norway for comments and feedback at various stages of this project.
Funding from the Norwegian Research Council, grant no. 237840, is gratefully acknowledged.
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and being assigned the written exam has large negative effects on exam outcomes that we
argue are causal, reducing grades and almost doubling the probability of failing. This, in
turn, has important consequences for the students as this exam is mandatory in order to
finish high school and get a diploma. Using the exam form as an instrumental variable and
interacting with predetermined performance, we instrument both for the test score itself
and for the event of failing the exam to look at further performance in school, finding
large and persistent effects on later graduation. Among the marginal students shifted
into failing by our instrument, more than 50% do not get a diploma on time and almost
50% still haven’t acquired one at age 27. This could potentially have large consequences
for these students, because further progression into tertiary education requires a diploma.
Our estimates on longer term labor market earnings, however, are close to zero, indicating
that the value of finishing high school might not be very high for these marginal students,
but results are too imprecise to draw firm conclusion.
Our paper relates to four strands of the literature. First, as mentioned above, we relate
to the large literature on returns to education in general and high school completion and
GED certification in particular (Cameron and Heckman, 1993; Clark and Martorell, 2014;
Heckman et al., 2014; Heckman and LaFontaine, 2006; Tyler et al., 2000). Second, we
estimate effects of passing an exam on future performance in school, which could be
though of as working either as a signaling effect within schools (Jacob and Lefgren, 2004;
Manacorda, 2012) or through student motivation (Diamond and Persson, 2016). Third,
the oral exam allows schools to apply local grading practices to the exam scores, in contrast
to the centrally made and graded written exams, which relates our paper to a literature in
grade inflation and manipulation of test scores (Andersland, 2017; Apperson and Bueno,
2017; Dee et al., 2016; Diamond and Persson, 2016; Jacob, 2005; Jewell et al., 2013; Lavy
and Sand, 2018) Fourth and finally, we relate to a few papers on the effects of various
shocks to exams on longer-term outcomes. These include local pollution (Ebenstein et al.,
2016), quasi-random variation in preparation time (Bensnes, 2018) and the effect of the
exam course itself (Falch et al., 2014).
This paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 presents the institutional setting of Norwe-
gian high schools and exam allocation, Section 3 presents our Norwegian registry data,
sample selection procedure and some summary statistics and Section 4 the empirical
strategy. Results are found in Section 5, while section 6 concludes.
2 Institutional setting
The Norwegian compulsory education system is operated by the municipalities and con-
sists of primary school (ages 7-12) and lower secondary school (ages 13-15). Children
born after 1990 receive ten years of compulsory schooling and enroll in primary school
the year they turn 6 years of age, while the children in our sample started school at age 7
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and have 9 years of compulsory schooling before high school. The next tier of education
is upper-secondary school (ages 16-18) which is operated by the counties and roughly
corresponds to high school in the U.S. High schools are predominantly public2 and free,
and more than 95 percent of students enroll in high school the same year they finish com-
pulsory schooling. A school reform in 1994 afforded all students the right to a high school
education, but students still had to apply for admission and were allocated to high schools
based on ranked preferences and final grades from lower secondary school. Students have
a choice between vocational and academic track high schools, but we study only students
enrolled in the latter. Academic track high schools last for three years (first, second and,
third grade), and qualifies students for tertiary (college) education. For a more in-depth
description of the Norwegian school system see Falch et al. (2014).
High school exams are either centrally or locally given. Central exams are prepared
by the Norwegian Directorate for Education and Training (UDIR) which is the executive
agency for the Ministry of Education and Research and given as nationwide written
exams to all students at the same time. All central exams are graded by a randomly
assigned external examiner.3 Locally given exams are formally administered by the county
administration, but is in practice partly delegated to the individual high schools. Locally
given exams are typically oral exams4 where the students are assessed by one internal
(most often the subject teacher) and one external examiner. Both examiners should in
principle agree on the exam grade, but the external examiner has the final word in case
of disagreement. Exams are held in late May and June, written exams typically earlier
than oral exams. Exams are graded on a numerical scale from 1 to 6, where 1 is a fail
grade, 2 is the weakest passing grade, and 6 is the highest grade. The same scale is used
on the teacher assessed internal grades. If a student fails the exam, or are sick on exam
day, they are still permitted to progress to the next grade, and have the opportunity to
re-take the exam in following semester.
Students are at risk of being selected for examination in all graduating courses through-
out high school. A graduating course is defined as any course where the internal grade
may end up on the diploma. At the end of third grade all students who passed all gradu-
ating courses and exams within stipulated time will receive a primary diploma.5 All high
school students must take several mandatory exams. In first grade, 20 percent of students
sit for one exam in a graduating course. In second grade, all students sit for one exam
in a graduating course. In third grade, all students take four exams: one written exam
in Norwegian language, two written exams in graduating courses, and one oral exam in
28 percent of students attend private high schools (SSB Statistikkbanken)
3A subset of the assignments assessed by each examiner are cross-examined.
4Other forms of locally given exams either practical or oral-practical. The execution of these exam
types are similar to oral exam for all practical purposes, and we group them together and contrast them
to the centrally given written exams in the following.
5A primary diploma gives students some benefits when applying for colleges straight after high school.
Students who change courses, re-take exams or who do not finish on time will get a regular diploma.
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a graduating course. We exploit a feature of the second-grade exams: Exam form is as
good as randomly assigned conditional on predetermined course choices. The process
of allocating students to exams first starts in early spring when the county administration
sends lists of centrally given exams to all high schools in the county. After the internal
grades are determined, school administrators6 assign students to written or oral exami-
nation, and sends a list of student-exam pairs back to the county administration. The
county administration checks the list for course-level randomization and availability of
external examiners before approving the school’s proposal. Exams are then held in late
spring or early summer.
At first glance, this process seems to introduce a possibility for school administrators
to engage in grade manipulation by allocating students to their best matched exam, both
in terms of exam course and type. However, several formal and informal restriction make
such manipulation implausible. First of all, since each student must be assigned to exactly
one exam, it is not possible for school administrators to simply select the best students
for examination. It is not enough to only assess the potential outcomes of the individual
students, but also their potential outcomes relative to all other students. Official instruc-
tion by the directorate also stipulates that exam allocation must be randomized and that
oral exams must make up around 30 percent of the total exams.
Furthermore, school administrators also need to navigate several informal restrictions
when assigning students to exams. First, oral exams are costly and there is a fixed cost
component to arranging an oral examination. This means that schools not only want
to minimize the number students selected for oral examination, but also the number of
courses. Second, school administrators typically start out by planning the examination
schedule for third grade students which have four exams each. The exam schedule for
the second-grade students are then planned later, conditional on available dates, teachers,
rooms, etc. Third, school administrators also try to rotate courses and teachers over time
so as to even out the burden among the teachers. Finally, in some cases students may
have certain course combination that limits the choice set of the school administrators,
both when it comes to subject and type of exam.
All these formal and informal restrictions make any attempt by the school adminis-
tration to inflate (maximize) the school level exam grades by manipulating student-exam
assignments very difficult, not to mention the extremely detailed nature of the knowl-
edge of students potential outcomes in various courses and exam types needed in order
to efficiently execute such manipulation. In practice, the allocation of students to dif-
ferent exams is more of an accounting exercise where many competing concerns must be
balanced, without much room for other motives.7 This institutional setting provides us
with an empirical strategy that may enable us to estimate the effect of exam form on
6Usually the principal, or in larger schools, an exam administrator.
7We talked to several school administrators who promoted this view.
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exam outcomes: Conditional on school, year and subject, the form of examination should
be as good as randomly assigned. In section 4, we provide evidence of this conditional
randomization by showing that characteristics such as student performance, parent’s ed-
ucation and gender are balanced across examination form. An important part of being
assigned an oral exam is that schools have the potential to apply grade inflation. As
our first stage estimates reveal, students are systematically awarded better grades on oral
exams than on written exams. This bias seems to be well-known among students and
education professionals alike. Still, little has been done to investigate the causes of this
phenomenon. One argument is that students are simply better at oral examinations, and
that the examiners help the students display their potential. While this might be part
of the story, another explanation is that schools and teachers engage in various forms of
grade inflation which diffuse into oral exam scores.
In an analysis of grading practices in Norwegian compulsory schools, Galloway et al.
(2014) find evidence for systematic school-wide differences in grading. They document a
high degree of within-school correlation in subject grading practices, meaning that schools
who systematically inflate grades in one subject often do the same in others as well.
Furthermore, the researchers find that schools with low ability students are more likely to
inflate the grades which suggests that there is some amount of grade normalization going
on in the schools.
School level grade normalization is one potentially important source of grade inflation.
All students apply for high school admission using the GPA from lower secondary school,
this means the average ability of the student body varies across schools and over time
with the admission cut-off. Still, schools tend to use the full range of the grading scale,
and there might be strong internal pressure towards grading conformity within schools
(from principal, other teachers, parents). If teachers normalize grading behavior to fit
the ability distribution of the students, school level grade inflation will be an emergent
feature. This means we will see larger grade inflation in schools with low ability student
over high ability students. Another potential source of grade inflation is competitive
pressure between schools in the same county/municipality. School administrators might
encourage grading leniency when competing with otherwise similar schools for the same
students.
Teachers might also engage in grade inflation on a individual student level. Teachers
develop personal relationships with the students, and in some cases the families, which
makes it uncomfortable to award bad grades. Another possibility is that teachers some-
times grade students conditional on person specific background information (i.e. she lost
her mother, or her parents separated). This kind of practice is asymmetric in nature since
teachers are unlikely to discount student performance based on positive factors. Hence,
the effect on grades will be positive.
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Since written exams are randomly and anonymously graded by external examiners
using the same assessment guidelines and cross-validated between examiners, these grades
are the best available measure of student ability. Internal grades are composite measures
of student ability as well as school, teacher, and subject level grade inflation. Since oral
exams are partly graded by the subject teacher, much of the same teacher and school level
grade inflation will be included in the exam scores. This means that being assigned to a
written exam implicitly will entail an exam score penalty. We provide evidence for this
in Section A in the appendix.
In the following analysis we exploit both the random exam-form assignment and the
written exam penalty to investigate the effect of grades on short and long-run outcomes.
3 Data and summary statistics
Our data comes from Norwegian administrative registers for the years 2004 – 2016. All
data are hosted at Statistics Norway and contain unique individual identifiers that allow
us to link students across registers and connect students to mothers’ and fathers’ char-
acteristics. From the residency registers, we obtain data on municipality of residence,
gender and birth dates. Enrollment data for high school comes from the national educa-
tion registers, while the results from individual courses and exams are reported annually
by each school to VIGO, who administers the IT-systems and databases for the coun-
ties operating high schools. Graduation data comes from the national transcript records
(“nasjonal vitnem˚alsdatabase”), covering all issued high school diplomas with results in
individual courses.
To measure longer-run outcomes, we use application data for tertiary education from
the the centralized application procedure (“Samordna opptak”) and data on the total
years of finished education from the national education registers. These contain field of
study and type of degree for all finished schooling at Norwegian institutions. Finally, we
measure labor supply using yearly income data from tax records.
To define our sample, we start out with all youths alive and resident in Norway and
turning 18 years of age in the years 2004 to 2007. Of these, we focus on those who start
their second year of a three year academic track high school program in the respective
year, ruling out redshirters, delayed students or those who start early.8 We make a few
other sample restrictions to ensure that our students are as comparable as possible, as
documented in Table 1.
We then link these students to all registered courses with results, allowing us to com-
pute a grade point average for each student based on the teacher-assigned grades before
the exam. Next, we link these students to the results from the end-of-year exams. For
8Both early and late school start is uncommon in Norway.
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Table 1: Sample selection
2004 2005 2006 2007 Sum %
Resident in Norway at age 17 55,385 56,933 60,276 62,231 234,825 100 %
Started second year of high school 49,525 50,987 54,396 56,152 211,060 89,9 %
Registered for only one study program 45,710 47,424 50,266 52,884 196,284 83,6 %
Academic track 22,426 23,033 24,573 26,123 96,155 40,9 %
Standard student status 21,928 22,738 24,244 25,439 94,349 40,2 %
Full time student 21,268 22,461 23,865 25,178 92,772 39,5 %
Registered for at least one course 20,110 21,210 22,512 24,467 88,299 37,6 %
...with exam 20,109 21,207 22,508 24,467 88,291 37,6 %
Takes at least one exam 18,495 19,711 19,839 22,747 80,792 34,4 %
At most one exam, valid teacher grade 18,036 19,626 19,807 22,696 80,165 34,1 %
around 7,500 students, or around 8.5% of the remaining sample, we cannot find any exam
results and consequently have to drop them from the sample. The main reason for this is
that our data lack the results from postponed or re-taken exams due to sickness, no-show
or a failed exam. If this is endogenous to being assigned a written exam, this sample se-
lection will potentially bias our estimates, but we return to this issue in section 4, where
we show that the groups assigned written and oral exams are balanced with respect to
pre-assignment performance and other characteristics. Lastly, we drop a few hundred
students that are registered with more than one exam, which could happen if students
take courses privately, without registering for instruction. These students are not subject
to the standard exam draw.
This leaves us with a final sample of 80,165 students. Summary statistics for these
students are given in Table 2, both for the sample as a whole and for students assigned
oral and written exams separately. Girls are somewhat over-represented due to the sam-
ple selection criteria, and students are on average registered for almost 11 exam-eligible
courses throughout the year, with no discernible difference between students with oral
and written exams.
The students assigned oral exams, however, have somewhat higher GPA and teacher
evaluated grade in the course they’re assigned exam. This indicates that straightforward
comparisons of results for students with written and oral exams will not reflect causal
differences of the exam form. Rather, they reflect a mix of the effects of an exam form
and the effect of courses with different difficulty having different exams. In practice, the
courses chosen will affect both the exam form and likely the results on the exam, as some
courses are more difficult than others.
Furthermore, Table 2 reveals large differences in the results of the exam depending on
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Table 2: Summary statistics
Full sample Written exam Oral Exam
Variable mean s.d. mean s.d. mean s.d.
Female 0.54 (0.50) 0.53 (0.50) 0.54 (0.50)
Father’s years of education 13.82 (3.51) 13.84 (3.48) 13.76 (3.59)
Mother’s years of education 13.61 (3.45) 13.64 (3.42) 13.54 (3.52)
Number of exam-eligible courses 10.85 (1.43) 10.85 (1.42) 10.84 (1.45)
Teacher grade in exam course 3.88 (1.12) 3.82 (1.13) 4.03 (1.09)
Teacher evaluated GPA 4.03 (0.78) 4.05 (0.77) 3.97 (0.79)
Written exam 0.71 (0.46) 1.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00)
Grade at exam 3.66 (1.29) 3.42 (1.24) 4.22 (1.23)
Fails exam 0.04 (0.21) 0.06 (0.23) 0.02 (0.13)
Finishes grade 12 0.89 (0.32) 0.89 (0.32) 0.88 (0.32)
Starts grade 13 following year 0.99 (0.10) 0.99 (0.09) 0.99 (0.10)
Finishes grade 13 following year 0.80 (0.40) 0.80 (0.40) 0.79 (0.41)
Number courses in grade 13 9.60 (2.46) 9.61 (2.43) 9.58 (2.51)
Passed courses in grade 13 9.43 (2.59) 9.44 (2.56) 9.39 (2.65)
GPA in grade 13 4.05 (0.86) 4.08 (0.85) 3.99 (0.87)
Obtains primary diploma on time 0.72 (0.45) 0.72 (0.45) 0.70 (0.46)
Obtains any diploma on time 0.73 (0.44) 0.74 (0.44) 0.71 (0.45)
Labor earnings at age 27, 1,000 NOK 382.55 (230.15) 386.40 (231.62) 373.28 (226.30)
N 80,165 56,672 23,493
exam form. Students assigned a written exams score on average .8 grades lower and have
almost 4 percentage points higher probability of failing the exam than students assigned
an oral exam. Nonetheless, they have higher probability of both finishing second grade
and obtaining a high school diploma on time. Our sample of students take exams in a
total of 124 courses over the four year window. 45 of these courses have students sitting
for both written and oral exam(s) in the sample window, and the empirical strategy we
detail below exploits this variation between students who sit exams in the same course,
but with different exam forms.
4 Empirical strategy
The most straightforward way to evaluate the effect of exam form on immediate and
medium-run outcomes is to simply compare the exam results and graduation rates of
students with an oral and a written exam. This ignores, however, that the assignment of
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exam form may be endogenous. Although exam form is supposed to be drawn randomly by
school administrators, this is done conditional on course choices made by the students. In
particular, courses which more often have written exams may be of a different difficulty
than courses with oral exams, and students’ may have different strategies for choosing
courses, leading simple outcome comparisons of results for written and oral exams to be
biased.
To account for this, it is crucial to control for course choices. We do this by controlling
flexibly for fixed effects in a two stage least squares setup
yikt = αk + pit + κc(i) + βsikt + ikt
sikt = δk + ηt + λc(i) + γZikt + µikt
(1)
Where yikt is an outcome for student i at school k in year t. where αk and δk are
school fixed effects and pit and ηt are year fixed effects\. The fixed effects set κc(i) and
λc(i) controls for course choices. In our baseline specification, this contains fixed effects for
the exam course of student i, in practice ensuring that we compare students with different
exam type in the same course to estimate the effect of exam form. We show in the next
section that results are similar if we additionally control for the full menu of potential
exam courses. Finally, sikt is the exam score obtained by student i, which we instrument
using the exam form Zikt, a binary variable equal to 1 if student i was assigned a written
exam. The two parameters of interest are γ, reflecting the first stage effect of the exam
form on the exam score, and β representing the IV estimate of the effect of the score on
the outcome for the compliers.
As with all IV applications, we rely on relevance, exclusion and monotonicity assump-
tions. The relevance assumption is testable, and we show in the next section that the
instrument indeed affects the exam outcome. The exclusion restriction requires the in-
strument to affect the outcome y only through the treatment s. In order for β to be
interpreted as a causal effect of the exam form itself, we need exam form to be as good
as randomly assigned given the sets of fixed effects. As discussed in Section 2, the in-
stitutional setting provides a promising background for such conditional randomization.
Nonetheless, we cannot rule out the endogenous allocation of students to exams, given
the discretion afforded to local school administrators when assigning exams. We therefore
rely on balancing tests to show that the samples of students assigned different exam forms
are statistically indistinguishable when controlling for course choice. Panel A of Table 3
presents balancing tests for the assignment of exam form. In row 1, we condition only
on year fixed effects. It is evident that the two samples are not balanced with respect
to predetermined variables: Students assigned written exams come from families with
higher education, have higher GPAs but, somewhat surprisingly, have lower scores in the
course they’re assigned an exam than students assigned oral exams. These differences
are strongly significant. Moving to row 2, we add school fixed effects to account for any
12
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Table 3: Balancing tests
A: Simple specification (eq. 1)
teacher
GPA
mother has father has
female
Specification grade higher education higher education
Year fixed effect -0.209*** 0.0874*** 0.0133*** 0.00649 -0.00573
(0.0175) (0.0153) (0.00479) (0.00630) (0.00589)
add school fixed effects -0.179*** 0.107*** -0.0112 0.0160*** -0.0110**
(0.0163) (0.0127) (0.00846) (0.00470) (0.00554)
add exam course F.E. -0.0245 -0.0211 -0.0131 -0.00558 -0.00464
(baseline) (0.0238) (0.0151) (0.0115) (0.00758) (0.0102)
add course menu F.E. -0.0151 -0.0194 0.00649 0.00302 -0.0156
(0.0241) (0.0156) (0.00630) (0.00952) (0.0111)
N (spec. 3) 80,138 80,138 80,143 80,143 80,138
B: Interacted specification (eq. 2)
written exam ×
GPA
mother has father has
female
Teacher grade higher education higher education
teacher grade 1 -0.142 -0.000582 -0.0227 -0.0800
(0.117) (0.0578) (0.0715) (0.0651)
teacher grade 2 -0.0457 -0.0124 -0.0455* 0.00287
(0.0286) (0.0265) (0.0264) (0.0251)
teacher grade 3 -0.0134 -0.0258 0.0136 -0.0145
(0.0183) (0.0163) (0.0148) (0.0169)
teacher grade 4 -0.0144 0.00196 -0.00248 -0.00326
(0.0154) (0.0166) (0.0166) (0.0171)
teacher grade 5 0.0470 -0.0157 -0.00114 -0.0212
(0.0347) (0.0370) (0.0391) (0.0382)
teacher grade 6 0.00127 -0.00314 -0.00693 0.0107
(0.0145) (0.0138) (0.0145) (0.0150)
N 79,951 79,951 79,951 79,951
F -stat 1.246 0.443 0.708 0.621
p-value 0.282 0.850 0.643 0.714
Notes: Panel A shows balancing tests for the simple specification where the coefficients presented are for
a written exam dummy and the balancing variable are shown in the column header, using controls as
specified in rows (1) through (4). Panel B shows balancing tests for the same variables in the interacted
specification, using specification (3) from panel A. Standard errors are clustered at school (G = 327) and
robust to heteroskedasticity. Singleton observations are dropped, and the number of observations thus
vary somewhat over fixed effects sets in panel A. Reported number of observations are for the baseline
specification in row 3. ∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01
across-school differences in grading practices that correlate with course choices and/or
exam form. This does not alleviate the problem, but when adding exam course fixed
effects in row 3, all balancing tests shows insignificant differences. This is largely driven
by the point estimates dropping, not the standard errors increasing due to the added sets
of fixed effects. Our interpretation is that this accounts for the effect of individual course
choices: Because some courses are easier than others and the likelihood of being assigned
a written exam differ from course to course, unobserved ability will affect both the likeli-
hood of getting a written exam and the performance on the exam. In row 4 we introduce
a more robust course menu fixed effects, leading to a large drop in observations, without
the balancing tests changing dramatically. Our preferred specification is therefore the one
in column 3, including exam course fixed effects.
With a multivalued treatment such as an exam score, it is well known that the esti-
mated coefficient β represents a weighted average of effects for different complier popu-
lations defined in terms of counterfactual outcomes (Angrist and Imbens, 1995). In our
particular example, the instrument is likely to shift students exam scores down, both from
high to somewhat lower grades, but also from passing to failing grades. Without further
assumptions, we cannot know the relative size of the threshold specific treatment effects,
and large potential treatment effects for example at the fail margin could be masked by
no effects for other treatment shifts. In particular, it is tempting to redefine the treatment
variable to a binary indicator P = 1(sikt ≥ 2) equal to 1 if the student passes, because
the effect of failing a mandatory exam might potentially be large on later outcomes such
as high school completion and earnings. In order for the exclusion restriction to be valid
for this treatment defintion, we need the instrument to a) only affect the pass/fail mar-
gin or b) other instrument-induced shifts in exam scores to have no effect on outcomes
(Andresen and Huber, 2018).
We therefore expand our empirical strategy to be able to identify the effect of exam
score and passing the exam simultaneously. To this end, we exploit the fact that students
with different skills in the exam course, as measured by their teacher assessment in the
course given before the exam, are affected on different margins. Specifically, we instrument
both for the exam score s and the probability of passing P by interacting the entire
specification from before with the internal grade g the student received in the exam
course from the teacher prior to the exam form assignment:
yigkt = αgk + pigt + κig + βssikt + βSPikt + ikt
sigkt = δsgk + ηsgt + λsgc(i) +
∑6
g=1 γ
s
g1(gikt = g)Zikt + µsikt
Pigkt = δPgk + ηPgt + λPgc(i) +
∑6
g=1 γ
P
g 1(gikt = g)Zikt + µFikt
(2)
This specification of the first stages amounts to running the above specification sepa-
rately within groups of teacher assessed grades and using parametric assumptions on the
effects at other margins to be the same to separately identify the effect of passing the exam
14
and improving grades at other margins . The balancing tests for these six instruments
are provided in panel B of table 3. Compared to the simple specification, we cannot use
the teacher grade in the exam course itself as a balancing variable, because it is absorbed
by our fixed effects, but for the other four outcomes we see only one borderline significant
difference for all six instruments and 4 balancing variables, and the joint F -values are
small and far from significant.
For the IV estimate to be interpretable as a local average treatment effect, traditional
IV analysis rely on a monotonicity (or rather, uniformity) assumption: The instrument(s)
cannot affect some people’s exam scores positively and others negatively. This is, at
first glance, a potential problem in our application. Oral and written proficiency can be
seen as skills, and it is plausible that some students perform better at written than oral
exams. Remember, however, that oral examination also allows schools and teachers to
influence the grades of their students because the internal teacher is one of the examiners,
allowing the teacher who knows the student to potentially help the student perform better.
Moreover, this allows the school to affect grades directly, independently of the performance
of the student, which is impossible for the centrally given and graded written exams. Only
students who are relatively much better at written than oral exams, so that this effect
dominates the grade inflation practice of the school and any help the teacher may provide
during the examination, will be potential defiers in our setup. In Section A in the appendix
we provide evidence that supports the monotonicity assumption, and show that any group
of potential defiers will likely be relatively small. Furthermore, de Chaisemartin (2017)
show that 2SLS still identifies a LATE when the monotonicity assumption is weakened.
As long as there exists a sub-group of the compliers that have the same distribution of
treatment effects as the defier group and there are more compliers than defiers, the IV still
estimate the LATE for the remaining compliers. If the complier group is large relative to
the defiers, the IV estimate will closely approximate the LATE for the compliers.
Finally, it is important to emphasize the local nature of our IV estimates. In the
presence of treatment effect heterogeneity, our estimates of β will represent the causal
effect of exam score or passing the exam on the outcome for the population of compliers:
Students who do worse on the exam because they are assigned a written exam. This
group may be strikingly different from the average students. In particular, we argue that
the compliers on the pass margin are likely to be very weak students. They may or may
not respond similarly to the average student who fails an exam. We argue, however,
that the compliers to our instruments are a very policy relevant group: They represent
marginal students on the margin of dropping out of high school. As such, our results may
be particularly interesting for other policy interventions that aim to increase high school
completion, as these interventions are likely to affect students similar to our compliers if
they work at all.
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5 Results
Given the balancing tests reported in the previous section, we believe that exam form
is as good as randomly assigned given fixed effects that control for course choice. Next,
we present estimates of the immediate effect of exam form on various margins of exam
scores. Following this, we present IV estimates of other schooling outcomes in Table 5,
and finally long run estimates on high school graduation and labor market earnings in
Figure 1.
Panel A of Table 4 shows the direct impact of a written rater than an oral exam on
binary indicators of each exam score and on the linear score sikt in column 7. We see that
being assigned a written exam increases the probability of failing the exam by around 3.3
percentage points compared to the oral exam, around 75% of the mean in the sample.
Written exams decreases performance for students with all initial levels of performance,
even the top grades 5 and 6. On average, students assigned the written exams get around
.62 lower grades on the exam than students assigned the oral exams. These effects are
strongly significant, as evident by the large F -statistic on the instrument.
Moving to panel B, we use the interacted specification to see how different students
are affected differently. Unsurprisingly, the effects on the pass margin is concentrated at
the lower end, with students with a teacher assigned grade 2 being 12 percentage points
more likely to fail when given a written rather than an oral exam and the corresponding
number for grade 3-students being 5.1 percentage points. Even top students with grades
5 and 6, are shifted into passing by the instrument. Moving down the table, the impact
for higher performing students are concentrated at the top of the exam score distribution,
reducing the probabilities of obtaining the top grades. Taken together using the linear
score in column 7, the aggregate effect of a written exam on the linear score is relatively
flat at -.5 to -.6 points for students with initial grades from 3 to 6, and somewhat smaller
for the weak students. The joint F -statistics for these first stages are shown at the bottom
of the table, confirming that our six instruments strongly affect exam scores also in the
interacted specification. Although using all these six margins of response is interesting
in order to see how the instruments affect exam scores, using six endogenous variables
in our IV strategy makes interpretation of the estimates cumbersome. We therefore in
the following revert to the specification in eq. 2, where we instrument for a) a dummy
for passing the exam and b) the linear exam score itself. This allows us to disentangle
the effects on the compliers at the pass margin, where we expect potential impacts on
later outcomes to be large, from the effects on compliers on the score margin. Results
of this specification is found in Table 5, where outcomes are ordered by timing from
top to bottom. Starting in row 1, passing the exam unsurprisingly has a large effect on
the probability of successfully finishing second grade, as passing the exam is required to
pass. As the students have some opportunities to re-take the exam, the coefficient is not
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Table 4: First stage effects of a written exam
A: Simple specification
Exam score linear mean
≥ 2 ≥ 3 ≥ 4 ≥ 5 = 6 score Z
written -0.033*** -0.112*** -0.194*** -0.188*** -0.088*** -0.616*** 0.707
exam (0.004) (0.009) (0.012) (0.010) (0.007) (0.034)
F -stat 78.5 155.8 249.6 336.6 144.5 320.3
B: Interacted specification
teacher grade Exam score linear mean
× written exam ≥ 2 ≥ 3 ≥ 4 ≥ 5 = 6 score Z
1 -0.135 -0.041 0.010 0.001 - -0.165 0.794
(0.097) (0.039) (0.018) (0.011) - (0.127)
2 -0.120*** -0.165*** -0.057*** -0.008 0.000 -0.350*** 0.771
(0.017) (0.028) (0.016) (0.006) (0.000) (0.049)
3 -0.051*** -0.205*** -0.237*** -0.090*** -0.009*** -0.593*** 0.741
(0.007) (0.019) (0.021) (0.011) (0.003) (0.044)
4 0.002 -0.015*** -0.132*** -0.323*** -0.213*** -0.681*** 0.704
(0.002) (0.004) (0.011) (0.021) (0.019) (0.045)
5 -0.003** -0.001 -0.031*** -0.135*** -0.300*** -0.470*** 0.660
(0.001) (0.005) (0.009) (0.026) (0.041) (0.064)
6 -0.012*** -0.103*** -0.270*** -0.232*** -0.055*** -0.672*** 0.658
(0.002) (0.009) (0.017) (0.015) (0.007) (0.037)
F -stat 19.3 38.8 54.5 73.4 34.3 75.4 N
mean dep. 0.955 0.800 0.547 0.279 0.076 3.66 79,951
Notes: Each column shows results from separate regressions of the outcome as specified in the column
header on a) a written exam dummy in panel A and b) the written exam dummy interacted with teacher
grade in the exam course in panel B. All regressions control for school, year and exam course fixed effects,
all interacted with dummies of the teacher grade in panel B. Singleton observations in any regression are
dropped in all to keep a consistent sample. Standard errors are clustered by school (G = 327) and robust
to heteroskedasticity. ∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 5: IV effects of exam results on school outcomes
Outcome Passes exam Exam score N
(1) Finishes second grade same year 0.774*** (0.146) -0.000373 (0.00836) 79,951
(2) Starts third grade following year 0.0314 (0.0867) -0.00500 (0.00345) 79,951
(3) Finishes third grade following year 0.369* (0.190) -0.0351** (0.0145) 79,951
(4) Number of courses following year 0.776 (1.142) -0.0508 (0.0883) 79,951
(5) Passed courses following year 1.984* (1.199) -0.0577 (0.0894) 79,951
(6) GPA following year 0.547* (0.307) 0.00963 (0.0209) 76,838
(7) GPA in similar courses 0.815** (0.373) -0.0236 (0.0265) 71,655
(8) Primary diploma on time 0.630*** (0.167) -0.00940 (0.0127) 79,951
(9) Any diploma on time 0.544*** (0.183) -0.0120 (0.0130) 79,951
Notes: IV estimates using written exam interacted with teacher grade as the instrument for both the
continuous grade on the exam and a dummy for failing the exam. Each row contains results from
a separate run of our IV model using the outcome in the row header as dependent variable. Controls
include school, year and course fixed effects interacted with teacher grade. Standard errors in parenthesis,
clustered at the school level. ∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01
1, but almost 80 percent of the students induced to fail the exam by the instruments
do not finish second grade on time. There is, however, no effect on the probability of
starting third grade because having passed second grade is no prerequisite for starting
third grade. Compliers are however less likely to complete third grade the following year
(row 3). There is a lone significant coefficient for exam score for this variable, indicating
a surprising negative impact of better exam scores on the probability of completing third
grade the following year.
We find no impact on the number of courses the passing students register to, but they
pass almost 2 more courses during third grade (this estimate is only significant at the 10
percent level). Their overall GPA on courses in third grade is more than half a grade
point higher than failing students, a large effect corresponding to around 65 percent
of a standard deviation of this variable. Note, however, that we lose a few thousand
students for this outcome because they do not finish any courses so we can calculate
their GPA, an event that could potentially be endogenous to failing the exam. We next
investigate whether this is concentrated within courses similar to the exam course by
calculating the GPA in courses within four rough groups (STEM, language, social sciences
and humanities, other) and using the GPA for the course group of the exam course in row
7. The estimate of -.82 is significant and large, indicating stronger effects on courses in this
group than other courses, but keep in mind that we lose around 10 percent of the sample
for this outcome, which is potentially endogenous. These results could point to effects of
passing the exam working through motivation and performance in later school outcomes.
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Finally we estimate the effects on graduation in the last two columns. We find strong
effects on the probability of obtaining a primary diploma: students who pass because
of the exam form are 63 percentage points more likely to obtain a primary diploma the
following year, as the possibilities for re-sitting and re-taking exams are limited if you want
to obtain a primary diploma. Our estimate on the probability of having any high school
diploma on time is smaller than the estimate on having a primary diploma, indicating that
some of the compliers on the fail margin manage to redo the exam and get an ordinary
diploma on time.
More than 50% of the compliers who fail due to the exam form is however still without
a diploma by the year they were supposed to graduate, and we might wonder whether
they are just delayed in redoing the courses and exam or whether they have dropped out
altogether. To understand this, we estimate the impact on the probability of having any
high school diploma for all years we can measure in the graduation data. We use the
specification from equation 2 separately by age to see if the effects on graduation fall over
time, plotting the results in the top panels of figure 1. The estimates are remarkably
stable over time, decreasing only slightly, and students who fail the exam because of the
exam type are still almost 50% less likely to have a high school diploma 8 years after they
were scheduled to finish high school. This is an indication of clear long-term effects on
graduation rates for a group of marginal students: students who manage to get a diploma
on time if they’re assigned the easier oral exam, but who fail and drop out completely
when assigned the written exam. Thus, the group of compliers to this instrument could
be considered on the brink of dropping out, and are unable to recover from failing the
exam due to the exam form. Although this complier group is unique to the instruments
at hand, they might be similar to compliers to other policy relevant instruments that aim
to increase high school completion.
A natural next step is to ask how the lack of a high-school diploma affects these
marginal students, both in terms of later education and earnings. We do this in the
bottom panels of Figure 1, where we use a dummy for whether a person is enrolled in
tertiary education and labor earnings over time for each year from 18 (the year of the
exam) through 27 as the outcome of our IV model. As before, we keep the specification
from eq. 2 and run the model separately by age. Unfortunately, precision is relatively low
for this outcome, but there is indication of an increased probability of being enrolled in
higher education for the students who pass the exam, although these are significant only
at the 10% level at ages 22 and 23.
The estimated effects of passing the exam on labor income is plotted in the bottom left
panel with associated 95% confidence intervals. In light of the suggestive evidence from
above that finishing the exam may affect tertiary education, positive impacts on earnings
need not necessarily translate into long-term effects on education, because enrolling in
tertiary education means the student will enter the labor market later. The coefficients
19
20
(a) Exam pass: Has a high school diploma (b) Exam score: Has a high school diploma
(c) Exam pass: In tertiary education (d) Exam score: In tertiary education
(e) Exam pass: Labor income in 1,000 NOK (f) Exam score: Labor income in 1,000 NOK
Figure 1: Long run effects on high school graduation, higher education and earnings
Note: Figures show results of our interacted IV specification on the probability of having any high school
diploma, of being in higher education and on labor market earnings over time. Left panels shows the
impact of failing the exam, while right panels show the impact of one grade better exam score.
are relatively close to zero, indicating that passing the exam, and perhaps having a high
school diploma, does not matter much for the earnings for these marginal compliers, but
unfortunately the estimates are too imprecise to draw firm conclusions. Likewise, there
is no significant effect of increased exam scores on earnings. Despite the low precision,
these results indicate that measures to increase high school completion for these marginal
compliers might not be very efficient at raising labor market outcomes for these low-
performing students.
6 Conclusion
This paper addresses the impacts of passing a high-stakes exam on future performance
in school, graduation, tertiary education and later labor market outcomes. By exploiting
the unique quasi-random assignment to exam form in Norwegian high schools, we address
the selection into high school completion in order to estimate plausibly causal effects of
passing the exam. Furthermore, by instrumenting both for the exam score itself and
the event of passing the exam specifically by interacting with pre-exam performance,
we isolate a group of marginal students who are shifted out of school altogether by the
instrument, shedding light on the response of a group of students at the brink of dropping
out of school and potentially informing the effects of other policies aimed at combating
high school dropout.
Results indicate that the assignment to a harder written exam indeed shifts otherwise
identical students into worse performance on the exam. This includes both the important
margin of passing the exam, but also other margins of performance. Because exam is
high-stakes and passing the exam is required to eventually graduate, being shifted into
failing the exam has large and long-term consequences for the compliers: More than 50%
of them still do not hold a high school diploma at age 27, eventhough they are allowed
to re-take the exam. We also find evidence of dropout already during high school, and
some indication of worse performance in school the following year. Results for later labor
market earnings are too imprecise to draw strong conclusions, but estimates are close to
zero, indicating that the value of these marginal diplomas on the labor market might not
be very large. This analysis thus provides important insights for a policy relevant group
of compliers to a range of policies aimed at combating high school dropout.
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A Grade inflation and instrument monotonicity
The monotonicity assumption means that all who are affected by the instrument are af-
fected in the same direction, which in our setting means that no one can get a better
exam score by drawing written exam instead of oral exam. In this section we will demon-
strate that this assumption is likely to hold for the vast majority of our sample because
of two distinct emergent features of the school system. First, there seems to be a oral
examination specific exam score bonus that is persistent across several school character-
istics. Second, nearly all schools inflate the internal grades and oral exam scores of its
students, and that this inflation is factored out when written exams are graded by a ran-
dom anonymous external examiner. Together, these features give students allocated to
written exams a clear disadvantage which overshadow most individual differences in exam
taking ability.
Table 6 shows the average grades and exams characteristics in our sample on the school-
year level. In all sub-samples, the average oral exam scores are higher than average written
exam scores, with the average GPA and internal grade in the exam course in between.
While this suggests that students perform better on oral than written exams, we are not
comparing apples to apples. Answering such a claim requires a more nuanced approach.
For the monotonicity condition to hold, each student must perform equally or worse if
selected for written exam than if they would have if selected for oral exam. However, we
can never observe both outcomes for the same student, which means that this assumption
cannot be tested directly. Instead, we need to look for evidence that indirectly supports
the monotonicity condition. This means that for each exam grade, the student has a
corresponding internal grade. Exam gains can then be defined as the difference between
the exam grade and the internal grade, effectively removing subject, school, and teacher
effects from the exam grades. While gains from oral and written exams cannot both be
measured for the same student, we can observe the average gains from oral and written
exam in the same school each year. The difference between the average exam gains can
be interpreted as the school-year level written exam penalty and should be negative
for school-level compliers. Figure 2a shows that internal grades and oral- and written
exam scores all increase with school enrollment size. Nonetheless, the difference between
the exam scores and the internal grade does not seem to change much. The written exam
score is the best measure we have of student ability, and Figure 2b shows how exam gains
vary with average school-level written exam results. Not surprisingly, the best (worst)
performing students have the lowest (highest) written exam penalty. But the difference
in written exam penalty between the best and the worst performing students are nowhere
close to the difference in written exam score. A one grade increase in the average written
exam scores results in 0.4 grade reduction in the written exam penalty. This suggests the
existence of widespread grade inflation in schools with low-ability students. Gains from
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Table 6: School grades
2004 2005 2006 2007 All schools Large schools
GPA 4.00 4.03 4.05 4.02 4.03 4.08
Internal grade 3.84 3.88 3.91 3.88 3.88 3.95
Oral exam score 4.13 4.20 4.29 4.19 4.20 4.29
Written exam score 3.52 3.43 3.46 3.34 3.43 3.53
Oral exam gain 0.19 0.23 0.23 0.19 0.21 0.21
Written exam gain -0.27 -0.40 -0.39 -0.49 -0.39 -0.36
Written exam penalty -0.46 -0.63 -0.62 -0.68 -0.60 -0.57
School-level compliers 0.92 0.97 0.92 0.97 0.95 0.97
Number of exams 98.5 107.8 108.4 120.3 109.4 152.6
Number of oral exams 29.5 31.9 31.1 35.1 32.0 46.1
Number of written exams 69.0 75.9 77.3 85.2 77.3 106.5
Share oral exams 0.30 0.30 0.28 0.29 0.29 0.31
N schools 288 296 293 287 1,164 278
N students 18,053 19,626 19,807 22,696 80,182 40,754
oral exam, on the other hand, seems to be stable across schools with different levels of
written exam results. This suggests that school and teacher level grade inflation constitute
a large part of the written exam penalty we observe, but in addition there also exist an
oral exam-specific benefit. Figure 2c plots the gains from oral exam against the gains
from written exams at the school-year level, where compliers are above and to the left
of the dashed 45 degree line. Most of the observations (around 74 %) are concentrated
in the second quadrant where the gains from oral exams are positive and the gains from
written exams are negative.
However, school-level compliance does not directly imply individual-level compliance,
but it makes defiers less likely. Some students might naturally be more adept at answering
written exams than oral exams, but this will not necessarily threaten the monotonicity
assumption. As long as any idiosyncratic advantage individual students might have for
writing exams does not strictly dominate the benefits the student gets from oral examina-
tion, such as help from the subject teacher and exposure to grade inflation, the potential
outcome of an oral exam will still be higher than for a written exam and monotonicity
holds. On the other hand, school-level defiance does not directly imply that the students
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are defiers, but it makes individual-level compliers less likely.
On average, students who draw written exams are graded almost 0.4 grade points lower
than their own internal grade in the same subject, and 95.8 percent of students attend
schools where the average gains of written exam are negative. For oral exams, students
are on average graded more than a 0.2 grade points higher than the internal grades and
the average gains are higher than written exam gains for 96.3 percent of schools. This
translates to an average written exam penalty of -0.6 grade points.
In rare cases (less than 5 percent) the average gains from written exams will exceed
the gains from oral exams. We argue that this is partly the result of random sampling
noise. The number of exams can be quite low in some schools in some years, especially
for the number of oral exams, which increase the probability that random noise from
student-exam allocation or exam day conditions will dominate the written penalty. This
interpretation is supported by the decline in the share of schools with non-negative written
exam penalty as the number of exams increase as shown in Figure 2d. This can also be
seen in Table 6 as the share of school-level compliers are higher in large schools (0.97)
relative to small schools (0.93). To further show that this is not caused by the existence
of some special defier schools we calculate the average written exam penalty at the school
level by pooling all four years in our sample. Then the share of school-level compliers
increases to 99 percent in all schools, and to 100 percent for large schools.
26
27
3
3.
5
4
4.
5
A
ve
ra
ge
 g
ra
de
0 50 100 150 200 250
Enrollment
 Oral exam score
 Written exam score
 Internal grade score
(a) Average grades by enrollment
-1
-.5
0
.5
G
ai
ns
 fr
om
 e
xa
m
2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5
Written exam score
 Gains from oral exam 
 Gains from written exam
(b) Average exam gains by written exam score
-1
0
1
A
ve
ra
ge
 g
ai
ns
 fr
om
 o
ra
l e
xa
m
-2 -1 0 1
Average gains from written exam
(c) Gains from oral and written exams
.7
.8
.9
1
S
ha
re
 o
f c
om
pl
ie
rs
0 50 100 150 200 250
Enrollment
(d) School level compliers by enrollment
Figure 2: School-year level average effects of exam form
Note: Binned scatter plots of average school-year level exam scores and internal grades by second grade
enrollment in panel a). Binned scatter plots of gains in written and oral exams relative to internal grades
in panel b). Scatter plots of average oral and written exam gains at the school-year level in tpanel c)
excluding school-years with less than 5 exams in either exam form (3% of students). Binned scatter plots
of share of school-year level compliers by enrollment size in panel d), defined as schools where the average
gains from written exams exceed the average gains from oral exams in a given year. The binned scatter
plots are constructed by dividing enrollment and written exam scores into 20 groups, each containing the
same number of students. Enrollment is measured as the number of second grade exams at the school,
corresponding to the number of students.
